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SPEAKING OF MORAL RIGHTS
A CONVERSATION BETWEEN
EVA E. SUBOTNIK AND JANE C. GINSBURG
PROF. EVA SUBOTNIK: Today we are speaking about moral
rights in the digital age—in respect of some of the legal and
technological developments that have occurred since your 2001
essay, Have Moral Rights Come of (Digital) Age in the United States?.1
Let’s pick up where your piece ended off. Having considered the
traditional moral rights of integrity and attribution, you ended
with the provocative question of whether, instead of these rights,
we could expect a new sort of right in the digital age—a “full
disclosure right” is how you referred to it. You asked: “If moral
rights have come of digital age, should their realization be
achieved by conveying more information about the copy, or by
controlling the copy itself?” So I’d like to ask you to answer this
question from the vantage point of today, ten years on since you
first posed it.
PROF. JANE GINSBURG: The luxury of writing the essay was that
I didn’t have to answer that question, and now you want me to
answer it! I’m somewhat ambivalent regarding integrity rights. By
contrast, regarding the attribution right, I think it’s outrageous
that our law provides no general right of authorship attribution.
The right of the author or the creator to be recognized as “the
author” should be part of our general copyright law, and not
merely part of a moral rights mini-law. Furthermore, the
attribution right is not as difficult as integrity rights to implement.
Integrity rights are harder because there are prospectively two
different parties wielding the right to control alterations to the
work, or to authorize changes, adaptations, and so forth. One is
the holder of the derivative work right and the other, the holder
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of the moral right, is the author. The holder of the derivative
work right is not always the author. The author may once have
held the rights, but she may have assigned that right, or created
the work as a work for hire and therefore never have had
derivative work rights in the first place. The potential conflict of
interest between holders of different incorporeal rights in the
same object would require courts to determine whose rights
prevail. In moral rights jurisdictions, the author’s integrity right
would trump even an authorized adaptation, at least if the
modification harmed the author’s honor or reputation. Those
jurisdictions generally do not have “works made for hire;” the
actual creator is at least initially vested with moral and economic
rights, regardless of whether she was employed or commissioned
to created the work. Whatever the difficulty of recognizing an
author’s integrity rights against an employer for hire, when it
comes to attribution rights, I do not think that work-for-hire status
should detract from the actual authorship and recognition of who
is the creator, as opposed to who is the statutory author.
SUBOTNIK: Fair enough, but I’d like to push you a little
further on the “harder” issue of integrity rights. Can you
contextualize how a full disclosure right might dovetail with
integrity rights?
GINSBURG: Yes, back to the question that I keep trying to not
answer, which is: what about integrity rights? There is a potential
clash between the owner of the economic right to authorize
alterations and the author’s retention of the moral right. That
doesn’t mean, even in countries with well-established moral rights
systems, that the author in fact retains a veto over adaptations that
the author has otherwise authorized.
The author doesn’t
necessarily get to second-guess the exploitation of the work—
rather the question is whether the adaptation is, in the sense of
the Berne Convention, prejudicial to the honor or reputation of
the author. Not every change made to the work is prejudicial to
honor or reputation. Individual Berne member countries can
have a tougher moral rights standard, which is the case in France,
but I’m not suggesting that any U.S. moral right of integrity go
further than protecting honor or reputation. That constraint may
help to defuse some of the potential conflict between the
authorized exploitation of the work and the integrity right. But
ultimately, if we have an integrity right in the online context,
should that right consist only of the author’s right to compel the
adaptor or the person who has modified the work to provide the
means by which the public can access the work in its “correct”
form? This approach would permit readers or viewers to compare
the original work and the adaption, but would not necessitate the
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expunging of an adaptation that may prejudice the honor or
reputation of the author. Or do we also say that the author can
have that modified work expunged? The appropriate remedy may
depend on the facts: in some instances, the author’s integrity
interest may be sufficiently secured by a disclosure right; in others,
the harm to the author’s honor or reputation may warrant
curtailing the further dissemination of the altered version.
SUBOTNIK: Yes, well I wondered whether there might be
circumstances in which, in order to effectuate even a full
disclosure version of integrity rights, you might be calling upon
the author to acquiesce in the posting of the original work in
connection with the adaptor’s recapitulation of the work in a way
that, ironically, might actually be offensive to the author.
GINSBURG: I didn’t intend to suggest that the author’s right to
compel a link-back would give the person altering the work the
right to commercialize it in its original form. But you do point out
a different problem: if somebody other than the author has the
reproduction and public display or communication to the public
rights of the work in its original form, then perhaps the link from
the offending derivative work to some source that would allow the
public to perceive and compare the adaptation and the original
could, under some circumstances, conflict with the rights of the
holders of those other economic rights. If the author has retained
those rights, no problem, but if not, then does a link-back to a
source other than one controlled by the relevant economic
rightholder create some form of unwarranted competition with
that rightholder? Would a link-back in effect compel the
rightholder to provide the work in its original form for certain
kinds of free access that might not otherwise be within its business
plan? That’s an excellent point that I had not thought of at the
time of the essay. I was probably thinking of a much simpler
universe in which there would always be a consultable copy on the
author’s own web page. But I don’t know that I had any basis
other than an unsupported assumption for saying that.
SUBOTNIK: Another question I’d like to ask relates to visual
works. Is there any way in which the Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990 (VARA)2 could be applied to provide for moral rights in
respect of digital works? Specifically, the definition of a “work of
visual art” that is covered by VARA includes paintings, drawings,
and prints “existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author,” and exhibition photographs under similar circumstances.
Could we envision a limited, digital edition in which there would
2

17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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only be 200 displays such that VARA rights would be triggered?
GINSBURG: No. On its own terms, it is totally clear. VARA
extends only to hard copies and then only to certain hard copies.
SUBOTNIK: Well, the larger issues that I’m trying to get at are
the extent to which the statutes and case law deal with, or fail to
deal with, the notion that creativity increasingly exists in digital
form, and the extent to which moral rights principles should apply
equally to those works.
GINSBURG: I think you could have a right of integrity in a
digitally expressed work, but it is not going to come from VARA.
If you couple the right of integrity with the derivative work right so
that the work cannot be substantially altered: that exists in the
digital realm as much as it does in the hard copy realm. An author
who grants the rights to reproduce and distribute digital copies of
the work doesn’t thereby grant the right to change the work.
SUBOTNIK: But of course the drafters and supporters of VARA
obviously didn’t think that coupling the integrity right with the
derivative work right was sufficient for a work that qualified as a
“work of visual art.”3
GINSBURG: You’re quite right that VARA can, and is intended
to, preserve integrity rights even when the author has alienated
the derivative works right. But VARA provides no solace to
creators of works made for hire, who also lack derivative works
rights, because VARA explicitly excludes works made for hire.
SUBOTNIK: What about the attribution prong of VARA—what
about those types of rights?
GINSBURG: I don’t think the attribution prong of VARA,
which is totally dependent on the definition of a “work of visual
art,” is all that well thought-through. When Congress adopted that
very narrow definition, it was worried about integrity rights but
treated attribution rights in parity—without considering either
whether the policies underlying attribution rights are distinct from
those informing integrity rights, or whether the objections to
integrity rights also apply to attribution rights. I’ll give an
example or two that demonstrate the mindless cut-and-paste
quality of VARA’s limitation of attribution rights to “work[s] of
visual art.”
VARA enables a visual artist not only to seek attribution for
works of visual art that she did create, but also to prevent
attribution of her name to works of visual art that she did not
create. But the statute gives these rights only to “the author of a
work of visual art.” Let’s take a photographer: unless one or more
of her works were “produced for exhibition purposes only” (and
3

17 U.S.C. § 101.
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exist only in 200 or fewer signed and consecutively numbered
copies), she is not “the author of a work of visual art.” So if
someone affixes her name to a work that does qualify as a “work of
visual art,” she has no claim. Perhaps she can remedy this
problem by, once in her life, creating a work that comes within
VARA’s “work of visual art” definition. If, for example, she paints
a one-of-a-kind squiggle, has she now acquired the status of an
“author of a work of visual art,” thereby entitling her forever
thereafter to prevent the misuse of her name in connection with
other works of visual art? If the need to undertake that sort of
artificial behavior sounds silly, it’s no more absurd than the
statute’s failure to distinguish between the interests underlying the
two different moral rights of integrity and attribution.
But note that even if an artist has produced a “work of visual
art” in the ordinary course of his creative processes, he still may
not be out of the woods enough to take full advantage of VARA’s
attribution rights. Let’s say I put together a couple of slabs of
rusting metal and sign them “Richard Serra.” Serra—and we’ll
stipulate that he’s an “author of a work of visual art”—would have
a right under VARA to prevent my misattribution. But if I chose
to reproduce those slabs in 201 signed copies, Serra would have
no VARA claim because the outer limit of VARA-eligible multiples
is 200. Or, if I chose to reproduce those slabs in fewer than 200
copies – even as few as two – but did not “consecutively number”
them, then no copy would qualify as a “work of visual art” and
Serra would have no VARA claim. The upshot is that Serra’s
attribution rights are completely dependent not only on what he
has undertaken to accomplish (i.e., to create a work and ensure
that that work qualifies as “a work of visual art”), but also on the
way in which a later-comer has chosen to reproduce her slabs.
In any event, given the narrow definition of a “work of visual
art,” and its non-application to mass multiples, whether physical
multiples or digital multiples, VARA’s attribution rights are clearly
inadequate. This is why I think we should have an attribution
right, but it should not emerge as part of some expansion of
VARA; it should be a core right of its own.
SUBOTNIK: The digital age offers certain advantages for moral
rights—the potential conflicts that we might have seen in a bricks
and mortar world between attribution rights and integrity rights
do not arise. In the digital space, there’s enough room to put
your name anywhere you want without distorting the work
unnecessarily, so that as much as we are struggling with how to
effectuate moral rights principles in our current age, the
technology is there to facilitate the rights. Which brings me to a
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related topic—in your current piece,4 which comments on the
earlier essay,5 you discuss certain aspects of the role of copyright
management information (CMI), which can include the name of
and other identifying information about a work’s author. That
piece will speak for itself, but I wonder if you have any thoughts
you’d like to share on the way in which the use of CMI is
effectuating—successfully, or unsuccessfully—any moral rights
goals.
GINSBURG: The case law is very inconsistent so it’s a little hard
to tell what the current positive law on CMI is. If the author’s
name is included in a website to which the public could link to
access the work, would CMI protection cover the author’s name?
Is the name conveyed “in connection with” the work even though
it’s not embedded in the work? Suppose a work has many creative
contributors. Those with top billing might be listed on a webpage
one click away from the content. Secondary billing, two clicks.
Tertiary billing, three clicks. And so on. How many clicks away
from the work before the author’s name is no longer supplied “in
connection with” the work? It is important to interpret the criteria
for CMI in a way that encompasses creative ways of providing for
attribution. But I think the biggest problem with the CMI
provision is its double knowledge and intent standard. Section
1202 itself makes it really difficult to prove that not only was the
information knowingly removed or altered, but further that it was
removed or altered knowing that that act would facilitate further
infringement.6
SUBOTNIK: Right. It’s not enough that the steps taken be part
of a course of infringement itself. The removal or alteration has
to be done with the knowledge that it will induce or facilitate
further acts of infringement.
GINSBURG: Or with reasonable grounds to know. So there
might be a willful blindness variation, but even so, it’s a lot to
show. It’s not enough simply to show that somebody knowingly
removed the identifying information.
SUBOTNIK: One of the suggestions you raise in your new piece
is whether placing a copyrighted work into a file sharing
environment would be sufficient to show the requisite intent.7
This suggestion made me think of the ongoing debate, in another
copyright policy context, over the “making available right”—
essentially, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody hears it, has it

Jane C. Ginsburg, Moral Rights in the U.S.: Still in Need of a Guardian Ad Litem, 30
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 73 (2012).
5 Supra note 1.
6 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
7 Supra note 4.
4
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really fallen?
Likewise in our case: would releasing the
copyrighted work in a file sharing context, without proof of its
further dissemination, meet the requisite intent standard under
Section 1202?
GINSBURG: Step two of the knowledge standard—knowing
that it will “induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal an
infringement”—maybe that would cover file-sharing networks. If
you’re making the work—now deprived of its identifying
information—available for others to further circulate, and they
will further circulate it without the identifying information, that
will facilitate infringement. So maybe file sharing networks are an
example of a type of downstream use that might meet the double
intent standard. Arguably, it’s the placement of the work in the
P2P (peer to peer) network that facilitates infringement, not the
removal of identifying information—that is, P2P file “sharers” will
infringe whether or not they have access to CMI—but one can at
least entertain the (hopeful) possibility that some participants in
the P2P network would not further distribute the work, were they
aware of the author’s name, terms and conditions for use of the
work, etc., and therefore the removal of CMI enhances the
likelihood of further infringing downstream distribution.
SUBOTNIK: And, in fact, P2P file sharing is a very common
mode of distribution in these circumstances.
GINSBURG: Right. And indeed, one of the concerns of
photographers and illustrators in the context of the debate over
orphan works is that their works will be forced into orphanage
because people will remove the identifying information and the
visual works will be available in various ways over the Internet.
Those photographers might have a CMI claim against somebody,
but what they mostly want is not to have that identifying
information removed in the first place. That observation raises
another question about the efficacy of Section 1202: if the
objective here is not so much to provide a remedy as to discourage
the conduct that would ultimately lead to a remedy, the conduct
we want to discourage is not just violations of authors’ moral rights
interests. Rather, we want to encourage, as a global matter, the
reliability of information about the lawful (and presumably
compensated) distribution of works on the Internet. Whether
Section 1202 has played any useful role in this regard is a fact
question to which I don’t have an answer.
SUBOTNIK: Your reference to the integrity of the marketplace
for copyrighted works is a perfect jumping off point to talk about
one of the other major subjects of your two essays, which is Dastar
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Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,8 and its implications.
GINSBURG: The first essay was pre-Dastar; that’s why it was so
comparatively optimistic.9
SUBOTNIK: You argue in your recent piece that the Dastar
Court is not entirely clear about whether the “goods” that can be
reached by Lanham Act Section 43(a) could ever include
intellectual products rather than physical goods in the way that the
Court focused in the case.10 So let me ask if you have any thoughts
how Dastar might be applied to purely digital works/goods and
about whether you see any unique issues that would arise out of
such an application.
GINSBURG: The Lanham Act applies to goods and services.
Services are not physical, tangible goods. So one issue relates to a
service like a television broadcast: how do you map the Dastar
holding onto the “origin” of a television program? To draw on an
old example—I think I gave this example in another article—take
the show I Love Lucy, that was first broadcast on CBS. If the origin
of I Love Lucy is the network, does that mean that when the show
goes into syndication, and so you see it on some local television
station rather than on the network station, it now has a different
“origin”?
Is the “origin” the production company—Desilu
Productions? I don’t know. It strikes me as difficult to apply to
services the apparently bright line that Dastar creates with respect
to “goods.” And if the objective of Section 43(a) is to protect
against consumers’ receipt of unreliable market information, it
would seem to me that you would want to make sure that the most
pertinent information is the subject matter of the legally
cognizable claim. I don’t know that the broadcaster is the most
pertinent information, as opposed to the production company.
Maybe it’s the production company, maybe it’s the principal actors
or screenwriters, I don’t know. But it does become difficult, much
more difficult, to identify who has standing in the Dastar sense
when it comes to services. If you say that Dastar on its own terms is
incomplete, then maybe that makes it possible to rethink how
Dastar would properly apply in the digital context. But I think that
the way courts have been interpreting Dastar is not very
encouraging—most courts have read Dastar as saying, “Do not run
to the Lanham Act for claims arising out of non-attribution or
even misattribution!” The attempt to distinguish Dastar on a
reverse passing off/passing off basis does not seem to me to have
been entirely successful.
SUBOTNIK: This was Justin Hughes’ argument from a 2007
8 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
9 Supra note 1.
10 Supra note 4.
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article he wrote.11
GINSBURG: And I think that he may be right, but I’m not sure
that the courts are agreeing. There’s the similar problem with
Section 43(a)(1)(B): some courts have said that, having, postDastar, lost a 43(a)(1)(A) false attribution of origin claim, you
cannot then dress up the claim as a misrepresentation of facts
claim under (a)(1)(B)—we can see through that, and if you can’t
do it under (a)(1)(A), then you can’t do it under (a)(1)(B)
either. That’s one problem and of course the other problem is
that (a)(1)(B) can be brought only in the context of commercial
advertising or promotion. It may be that a lot of mislabeled,
misattributed works will have some level of advertising or
promotion in order to attract the public, but not necessarily. The
third point, which I didn’t put in the current article, but which was
raised by Davies and Garnett in their Moral Rights treatise,12 is that
the materiality requirement would mean that featured authors or
featured performers might have a 43(a)(1)(B) claim, but what
about all the other participants—what, if any, claim do they have?
The answer may be well that they are no worse off than they were
before Dastar, because if they were non-featured artists, then
recognizing them or not recognizing them probably was not very
material to the purchasing decision. Thus, even before Dastar,
Section 43(a) was not a complete answer to the demand, if there is
one, for attribution rights. Pre-Dastar Section 43(a) cases illustrate
how to get the best fit you can with the legal tools you have, but
you have to recognize that the legal tool is an approximation, and
by its own terms it won’t fit every situation, and by its rationale it
shouldn’t fit every situation.
SUBOTNIK: Actually, I’d like to tie this discussion to a line of
argument from your earlier piece on the ostensibly unrelated
topic of copyright management information (CMI), but there is
actually a connection. There, you had mentioned two conceivable
ways that CMI could be intentionally altered. One was by
changing the text of the information—the CMI—itself, and the
other was more indirect, by changing the work to which the
information applies so that the CMI is no longer accurate.
GINSBURG: The latter is a Monty Python13 argument,
transposed to CMI.
SUBOTNIK: Have we seen any case law dealing with CMI play
out that interpretation?
GINSBURG: Not that I know of. The CMI cases have
Justin Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659
(2007).
12 Gillian Davies & Kevin Garnett, Moral Rights, 28-046 (2011).
13 See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (1976).
11
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concerned only authorship or producer identification, but it is at
least plausible as the theory that worked in Monty Python—that the
violation of Section 43(a)’s prohibition on false attributions of
origin consisted of attributing to Monty Python a work that was no
longer the work as created by Monty Python. The wrongful act
wasn’t attributing Monty Python’s Flying Circus to somebody else, it
was attributing to Monty Python a work that wasn’t really theirs
anymore. Perhaps, through the attribution aspects of CMI, one
can get partway toward an integrity right, but it is not an integrity
right that is, in the more continental style, grounded in the
creation itself. The pertinent question is: has the creation been
misrepresented, not: has the creation been mangled? It’s not the
mangling but the misrepresentation that’s actionable.
SUBOTNIK: So you get at the modification through the
misrepresentation.
GINSBURG: Yes, absolutely.
What makes the conduct
actionable is not the modification, it’s the attribution of the
modification. That’s also the underlying argument for the viability
of the Section 43(a)(1)(B) claim post-Dastar.
SUBOTNIK: One last question about Dastar. You note that the
Court says that the “mere repackag[ing]” of a work as one’s own,
without substantial change, would still be actionable.14 Might one
say that this acknowledgment that a 43(a) claim would still be
viable in such circumstances is a significant limitation on the reach
of the decision—in the digital era or otherwise?
GINSBURG: It depends on what “mere repackaging” means.
Consider plagiarism—I take your article in digital form and I put
my name on it and then I circulate it—is that “repackaging” in the
Dastar sense? I have now misattributed the intellectual origin of
the goods. But again, what are the “goods”—I don’t think we’re
talking about the 1’s and 0’s constituting the digital format of the
work. Perhaps Dastar, without having anticipated it, excludes
claims arising out of purely digital goods because there is no
“packaging” in the digital goods context, at least not at first blush.
By contrast, from a technological perspective, one might be
optimistic about voluntary attributions, because multiple
attributions may be easier to implement in digital formats,
allowing inclusion not only of featured authors but even of lesser
participants because one no longer encounters the limitations of
hard copy real estate on which to put the credits. Authorship
information could be available even on a click-through website,
but there would be some way of providing for recognition. That
doesn’t mean that every reader or viewer is forced to click on the
14

Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31.
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website with the attribution information, but at least that
information would be accessible and could not be removed
without authorization of the copyright owner. If there’s a
willingness to work toward implementing attribution, as a practical
matter, it can be done and done more easily than in the offline
world.
Where I’m less optimistic is on the integrity side (although
maybe not the integrity-full disclosure side, assuming we don’t
have the conflicts with other right holders to which you referred
earlier. The public could ascertain what the real thing is in the
digital communications format much more readily than back in
the hard-copy world). My concern goes more to the question of
whether there is popular respect for integrity, or whether the
“romance of remix” has become such that there is a popular
notion that works don’t have an integrity to be preserved—that
works are simply elements that are out there to be re-manipulated
according to the vision of the next comer. Such an outlook might
make it difficult, not as a matter of law or a matter of technology,
but as a matter of attitude to propagate integrity rights. Having
said that, it’s also true that on Flickr the dominant Creative
Commons license is NCND (NonCommercial-NoDerivatives), so at
least the bulk of the creators there think that if they disseminate
their work online, it should circulate as-is and shouldn’t be
altered. Perhaps not everybody is enamored of remix and we’ll
just have to see. But that’s not so much a legal question as a
question of, “If you build a moral rights system will anybody care?”
SUBOTNIK: I’d like to turn now to the relationship between
authors and publishers. Obviously these terms have come to mean
different things over time, and especially in the digital age, the
Internet age, it may not even be possible to distinguish these roles
fully anymore. Nevertheless, I wonder whether you see the trends
in the law of moral rights, such as it is, which favor publishers
above authors, even though we typically think of moral rights as
geared toward the interests of authors. So, for example, in your
earlier piece, you raised the point that whether copyright
management information (CMI) is provided or not is completely
at the discretion of the copyright holder, which may or may not be
the author. Further, in your current piece, you describe a model
of an “authorship integrity” license and you note that the
possibility that publisher and author interests might not always
align is a wrinkle that would have to be solved to make that model
useful.15 So, ten years later, are we seeing increased tensions
between these two groups and the way in which the law treats
15

Supra note 4.
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them? Does the law need to take better stock of author interests
in these areas?
GINSBURG: The problem with Creative Commons is that,
while it does create a kind of parallel universe for moral rights
through viral contracts—specifically attribution and potentially
integrity, depending on what combination of icons you choose—it
is not designed to assist authors who want to be paid for their
creations. And I don’t see any prospect of Creative Commons
itself combining with a payment mechanism. On the contrary,
Creative Commons is very hostile to DRM (digital rights
management), and most payment systems imply DRM. I suppose
you could have a pass-the-hat payment system compatible with
Creative Commons sensibilities, but I’m not sure I would rely on
“busker business models” if I was hoping to make a living. I think
the fundamental hostility of Creative Commons to DRM means
that we’re not going to have a professional authors’ integrity and
attribution regime through Creative Commons. For an equivalent
regime, but with payment too, you’d have to start all over again. I
don’t think it’s a question of technological capacity. The viral
license would need to catch on, and for that you have to create a
movement the way Creative Commons created a movement. I
don’t know if author groups on their own can create that
movement, whether author groups are going to need publishers
or commercial intermediaries of various kinds to help get things
off the ground. One needs both a critical mass of works and the
means to find those works. Creative Commons has bells and
whistles that make it easy to find Creative Commons works. How
do you create the same or at least aspire to a similar ease of
accessing works that have the type of license I have sketched out?
Much work has to be done to create a parallel universe that would
propagate moral rights through contracts but still pay authors, and
that gives rise to the questions of whether publishers are needed
for that, of whether publishers have any interest in providing that
assistance. The answers may depend a lot on the type of
publisher, the type of work, etc. In many cases publishers do have
common interests with authors in what I think publishers might
call authenticity—maybe they don’t want to call it integrity. The
way the book is labeled implies not only a proper attribution of
the authorship, but also a security that the contents really are the
contents. There, thus, can be some convergence between authors
and publishers where perhaps once upon a time, the publishers
might have been hostile because if anybody was going to be
changing the content of their works it was them—not a host of
third party outsiders.
SUBOTNIK: The model that you’re describing, to the extent it
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would make use of the help of publishers, sounds an awful lot like
the distribution of e-books currently, right? So how does your
authorship integrity (AI) license relate to the licenses under which
e-books are currently distributed?
GINSBURG: The “AI” viral license, unlike an e-book license,
anticipates that there will be lots of downstream distribution of
further copies; at the moment, the typical e-book license does not
have a built-in pass-it-on feature (on the contrary, in fact16). The
model adds actions to word-of-mouth recommendations—”I read
this book, I really liked it, and I’m going to send you a copy too.”
If the recommendation recipient wants to read it, then when she
opens it up, she gets the access page that says “pay here” and “here
are the other terms and conditions.” I can imagine that even for
commercial publishers, not just the author, the pass-it-on feature
of viral licensing could have some attraction because the user
doesn’t always have to go back to the publisher’s web page to
acquire and pay for the book. (Or maybe that’s unattractive if the
publisher is counting on visits to its website for advertising income
and exposing visitors to more of the publisher’s products.) If ebooks are on the verge of the same kind of peer-to-peer, illegal
dissemination encountered with songs and motion pictures, one
might want to have at least the identifying and integrity codes
embedded in the work.
SUBOTNIK: I’m curious about the relationship between your
model and the use of the word “integrity” in the license name.
Why style them as “authorship integrity” licenses rather than
“authorship integrity and attribution” licenses?
GINSBURG: I’m not especially wedded to “authorship
integrity.” Originally I was going to call it “creator’s content,” but
that I thought was confusing—it’s obviously sort of a parody of
Creative Commons, but I thought having two different CC licenses
might get confusing. I think I had had something like “authorship
authenticity,” but that’s AA and could be confused with Alcoholics
Anonymous so maybe we don’t want that. Of course “authorship
integrity” could be confused with artificial intelligence, but that’s
not so bad. I’m open to suggestions for some other name for this
license.
SUBOTNIK: The other thought I had, as you were speaking
about the need for norm-building—that is, fostering respect for
integrity and attribution rights, in a context in which authors are
16 See
Amazon.com Kindle License Agreement and Terms of Use, at
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=200506200&#content
; Sony Reader, at http://ebookstore.sony.com/termsofservice.html (see 2.1, 2.2, 7.7);
Barnes
&
Noble.com Terms and Conditions of Use, at http://www.barnesandnoble.com/include/t
erms_of_use.asp (see XII).
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paid for their work by downstream readers—was about some of
those successful self-published authors, like Amanda Hocking.17
Before she eventually received a $2 million advance from one of
the major publishers, she seemed to combine appeal to a
widespread audience with a lucrative business model based on
micro-payments. So, I think focusing on someone like her, and
her story, might give rise to the type of movement you’re talking
about here. In any event, thanks for a lively discussion on this
topic, Jane.

17

See, e.g., Strawberry Saroyan, Storyseller, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at MM26.

